Why Not Option Four?
A Comparative Study of various Peace Frameworks for
Jammu and Kashmir from the Kashmiri Pandit perspective
Subodh Atal, Ph.D., Lalit Koul, Sunil Fotedar
Also appeared on outlookindia.com:The
High Road to Peace?
Jun 29, 2001
The Kashmir "experts" all over the world
(which include almost all Indians and Pakistanis, if not the entire
population of the world) have been quite in a frenzy since the KSG proposals
came to light some two years back.
The Kashmir Study Group (KSG) had come up with a set
of "solutions", which are largely based on the idea of
"independence", or joint suzerainty by India and Pakistan over the
state, or at least Kashmir valley plus Rajouri and Poonch. This set of
"solutions" center around the idea of
"self-determination" and makes several assumptions that need to be
examined more closely. Some Kashmiri Muslim leaders such as Amanullah Khan
also support some form of such a framework.
Another approach discussed often is the freezing of
the Line of Control (LOC) as the international border. This solution, along
with the ones based on the KSG proposals, have been discussed threadbare in
many fora over the previous decade and have been the focus of
behind-the-scenes "Track II" diplomacy.
However, there is another potential solution that has
gained ground in the state, but not in the experts' minds. This is based on
"quadrification" – or the division of the state into four
discrete regions -Jammu, Ladakh, and carving of a Panun
Kashmir territory within Kashmir valley.
It is surprising that despite the characterization of
the state as the "most dangerous region on earth" and a
"nuclear flashpoint", no one has compared these solutions
side-by-side to examine the prognosis, pitfalls and potential benefits of
each. Before we get down to comparing these solutions, let us look at the
background of the "dispute".
In Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Punjabi and other
migrants steadily
overwhelmed the Kashmiris, until the latter formed
a minority. Today the
number of Kashmiri-speaking people in that region
has dwindled to
very small numbers. And any disillusion with
Pakistani rule lives
on mostly in the Northern Areas, still somewhat
distinct in character
from the rest of Pakistan.
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To study the background it is
important to look at Jammu and Kashmir State in the bigger picture both
historically and at the unfolding scene in its current neighborhood. In the
forty years between 1949 and 1989, a strong dichotomy existed between the way
India and Pakistan handled their portions of the state.
In Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,
Punjabi and other migrants steadily overwhelmed the Kashmiris, until the
latter formed a minority. Today the number of Kashmiri-speaking people in that
region has dwindled to very small numbers. And any disillusion with Pakistani
rule lives on mostly in the Northern Areas, still somewhat distinct in
character from the rest of Pakistan.
On the Indian side, an exactly
opposite approach was followed, in keeping with the soft, secular character of
the country. Article 370 was instituted to ensure that no Indian could own
property or live in the state indefinitely. The Kashmir valley Muslim
population was coddled to the point where it established hegemony over valley
minorities as well as peoples of Jammu and Ladakh. Kashmiri Pandits, the main
hurdle for Islamic fundamentalists in the valley, were steadily squeezed out
through economic, political and cultural pressure. Meanwhile a steady export
of fundamentalist propaganda and instigation to violence from across the LOC
flooded the valley.
The result was the catastrophe of
1989 and afterwards, which resulted from this forced segregation of the state
from the rest of India. Instead of imbibing secular, democratic and forward
looking ideals of India, the state, in particular the valley, became a hotbed
of Islamic fundamentalism and intolerance long before the Taliban came out of
its Pakistani madrassas and established its medieval rule over Afghanistan. As
a result, more than 350,000 Pandits, victims of torture, selective killings
and ethnic cleansing, ended up in refugee camps, and refuse to go back to live
under the constant threat of Lashkar, Hizbul and Jaish terrorists.
While much of the rest of India
enjoyed economic boom and opportunity in the 1990s, Jammu and Kashmir slid
further into the morass of fundamentalism and violence. The question is then
what are the solutions to this problem. Is "self-determination" the
answer? Are "Kashmiris" better off in Pakistan, India, or in an
independent state? Would a LOC-based solution, most often cited within India,
be the optimal solution?
One can make the error, as many
experts have, in assuming that "self-determination" is the shortest
and most painless route to peace. And it may also not be too difficult to
assume that maintaining the status quo, as in freezing the LOC, would confer
lasting peace. Or one can dig below the surface of the violence-infested alley
to look into the depths of the problem. Below we present a comparative
analysis of the different frameworks.
Self-determination:
It can result in one of three possibilities,
integration with India or Pakistan, or independence. Its benefits are clear
- but only for largest section of the population. The problem with this
seemingly obvious solution is that it confounds the issues of different
sections of the population and forces a one-size-fits-all answer down
everyone's throats.
Do Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs, Jammuites and Ladakhis
want independence or Pakistan? No.
What kind of rights will they have in such a
situation? For an answer one cannot avoid looking at the fate of minorities
in Muslim majority states of South Asia - Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Bangladesh.
Will residents of POK want to live as secular Indian
subjects? This is also a likely no.
In fact a recent poll by a Belgian group confirms
these suspicions – which the residents of the state are deeply divided
over what they want to do, with those opting for India or independence
outnumbering those opting for Pakistan.
In addition, ceding of the state, or portions of the
state, to Pakistan, or independence, would certainly be the equivalent of
handing over Afghanistan to the Taliban. Groups like the Lashkar and Harkat
will undoubtedly establish secure bases for expansion into the rest of India
and beyond, contrary to assumptions by Kashmiri Muslim leaders such as
Amanullah Khan who claim to visualize a "non-communal" independent
Kashmir.
There already is one Afghanistan that is holding the
whole world hostage, why support the creation of a second one? And what
about the economy? Afghanistan and Pakistan are reeling under the weight of
their fundamentalist, medieval approaches, so why would an Islamic majority
Kashmir be any different?
An offshoot of this framework suggests,
"open" or "soft" borders along the LOC. This has become
a panacea among "experts" wishing to "solve" the Kashmir
issue without understanding its background.
But this article points out earlier
that deterioration of the situation has resulted from the combination of
segregation of the state from India due to Article 370, and import of
fundamentalism from POK. "Soft" borders would thus only exacerbate
the situation.
Joint Suzerainty:
In their utmost wisdom, members of the KSG have signed
off on a novel solution - joint suzerainty over portions of the state by
India and Pakistan. No consideration is given to the stark differences
between the two countries, or even to the historic success rate of such a
framework.
How would secular, democratic India share control of
part of the state with a fundamentalist Pakistan ruled directly or
indirectly by its military?
Besides, the only example of such an arrangement is
the remote nation of Vanuatu in the Pacific. The British nd French
established a joint "Condominium" rule over the isles in the early
1900s. The arrangement was uch a failure that it is known derisively as the
"Pandemonium" in history texts. Can India and Pakistan pull off a
"Condominium" in the backdrop of the 12-year old Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism?
Again the answer is a resounding No.
LOC-based Solution:
This solution is most often discussed within India.
What is interesting at this point is that all these solutions start to the
east of the LOC. But more about that later.
The LOC-based framework essentially freezes the status
quo. It is certainly advantageous relative to the KSG proposals, as far as
India is concerned, but how would it be different from the last 12 years?
While sections of the local population remain
antagonistic to India, support for the insurgency will continue and the
temptation by Pakistan to fish in muddy waters will not abate. Abrogation of
Article 370 will be a positive step, however, the valley Muslims have built
such a strong hegemony across the state and can easily prevent true
integration of the state with India.
This would be a place free from Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism.
It would be a place where Kashmiri Hindus and
other minorities can freely
practice their political, cultural, social and
religious rights as charted in
United Nations' "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights", and
as in the rest of India.
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And unless the state is fully
integrated with India, the tendencies towards fundamentalism and
Talibanization will not recede. Thus this is only a partial, half-hearted
solution, one in keeping with India's weak-kneed personality.
Quadrification:
A framework that is based on separation of the state
into four regions attempts to resolve some of the issues left
untouched by the earlier "solutions".
A solution based on quadrification would create a
separate territory, Panun Kashmir, where the long-exiled
Kashmiri Pandits would be able to return in safety.
This would be a place free from Islamic fundamentalism
and terrorism. It would be a place where Kashmiri Hindus and other
minorities can freely practice their political, cultural, social and
religious rights as charted in United Nations' "Universal Declaration
of Human Rights", and as in the rest of India.
The Indian government could declare the area as a
Union Territory, with strong investment in technology and centers of
educational excellence. While Kashmiri Pandits would be accorded priority in
the territory as refugees returning from inhumane "migrant" camps,
other Indians willing to invest and work in high-technology fields would
also be welcome.
If India shows the resolve and commitment to stand by
Kashmir and help it move forward into the 21st century, the inevitable
outcome will be the rapid weakening of fundamentalist forces.
In a similar backdrop, Croatian Serbs, loyal only to
Milosevic-style Serb nationalism, vacated the Krajina region and migrated to
Yugoslavia once they were convinced that Croatia would not tolerate
balkanization of the young country.
Jammu and Ladakh will thus be able to escape hegemony
by Kashmiri Muslims, who would dominate the remaining part of the valley.
This may be the most difficult decision for the Indian government, one in
which it has to go beyond vote-bank politics, but in the long term would be
the most effective solution.
The knee-jerk response of opponents of this solution
is that it undermines secularism. But it is precisely the status quo that
has undermined secularism in the state over the last half-century.
Creation of Panun Kashmir
will allow it to integrate culturally and economically with secular India in a
rapid manner. The same will be true of Ladakh and Jammu.
The question then is what happens to
the rest of the valley. Article 370 will be abrogated from this portion also,
while steps will be undertaken to ensure that this region will preserve
Kashmiri Muslim culture. This will facilitate both the preservation of
Kashmiri Muslim tradition and a gradual economic integration with India.
It is the authors' belief that for
the sake of its long-term strategic security, India should not just be
interested in what happens to the east of the LOC, but what happens to the
entire state.
PM Vajpayee took the right step in
declaring that the July summit would be about POK (and we hope in particular
about Northern Areas, including Gilgit and Baltistan, which abut Afghanistan,
China, and Central Asia, and thus are too important geostrategically to cede
to Pakistan), although whether he remains true to his word or not is open to
question.
India should demand that Pakistan
end its illegal annexation of the area, and hand back the region to India or
grant it independence. The "so-called" Azad Kashmir can be ceded to
Pakistan but on one condition - that all terrorist bases inside Pakistan are
verifiably disbanded, and its support to the Taliban ended permanently.
The international community can play
its part by using a carrot-and-stick approach towards Pakistan with
respect to monetary aid. An Iraq-style arrangement, where economic aid is
contingent on verification of denuclearization, end of militancy and
disbanding of extremist groups should be instituted.
In addition, international observers
should be allowed on both sides of the current LOC in the state to ensure that
all electoral complaints are addressed.
In conclusion, we have examined
several frameworks suggested for Jammu and Kashmir, in the backdrop of its
unique and violent history. We feel that only one framework, which is based on
quadrification of the state, provides a solution that will uphold the rights
of all communities of Jammu and Kashmir.
Such a solution should be
implemented in combination with convincing Pakistan to permanently end its
support of Taliban and international terrorism.
The fruits of this strategy will
include not only long-term peace in Jammu and Kashmir, but also the weaning of
Pakistan and Afghanistan from their love affair with dangerous fundamentalist
forces.
South Asia should aim to be known
for its economic and cultural achievements, not for being labeled as the
terrorism hub of the world.
