War in the summer: what are the choices?
Subodh Atal,
April 6, 2002
Also appeared in
tehelka.com
Diminishing options
After September 11 last year, the thinly veiled Pakistani support for terror
in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India stood exposed. The subsequent US
all-out campaign in Afghanistan considerably lowered the threshold for India
to take the war into Pakistan for the first time since 1971. In the past three
months, as the Americans systematically dismantled the Al Qaeda network and
its Taliban and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support structure in
Afghanistan, there was absolutely no indication that Pakistan would
symmetrically reduce the level of its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. On
October 1, a suicide bombing targeted the Srinagar legislature building,
killing dozens of people. The December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament came
close to decimating India's political leadership.
In response, India ordered military mobilisation along the border with
Pakistan. These measures, in combination with halfhearted diplomatic moves
such as canceling the Delhi-Lahore bus, scaling down diplomatic staff and
denying overflight rights, were supposed to be part of an aggressive strategy.
However, this had no perceptible effect on Pakistan. Its military and
religious leadership and the ISI have too much invested in the
grab-Kashmir-at-any-cost policy. Pakistan has also begun to believe firmly
that its nuclear blackmail has beaten India into submitting to terrorism
indefinitely.
Thus, the response to India's half measures has been a continued
stonewalling by Pakistan. The terrorism continues, the infiltration continues,
and the extradition of 20 top terrorists demanded by India is never going to
happen. With the snows in the mountain passes likely to melt within the next
few weeks, the infiltration will accelerate, bringing in large numbers of
guerillas that escaped Afghanistan last year into Pakistan and are now
regrouping.
One of Pakistan's primary aims is to disrupt the legislative elections
slated for this fall in Jammu and Kashmir. Threats against participation in
the polls have already been issued, and the All-Party Hurriyat Conference's (APHC)
Kashmiri Muslim leadership has fallen in line. Pakistan may also be aiming at
ratcheting up the violence in Kashmir to levels exhibited by Palestinians
against Israel, hoping for similar pressure to build up on India, and a
possible US intervention.
At the crossroads
India now stands at the crossroads. It can continue the mobilisation of troops
at high cost without measurable results, or it can take necessary steps to
permanently remove the roots of terrorism export in Pakistan. Those roots lie
in its military infrastructure, its ISI, and its nuclear arsenal. Until these
three spokes of the foundations of the terrorism remain intact and powerful,
India can expect tens of thousands of more deaths in this decade, and perhaps
even September 11-like events.
Thus, there is a need to examine the war option to dismantle the Pakistani
military, intelligence agencies and its nuclear arsenal. This examination is
particularly significant before the summer months bring another violent
reprise of the past several years. It is also necessary to head off a US
intervention, if not this year certainly within the next several years.
The nuclear question
The knee-jerk reaction to any talk about an Indo-Pak war is that of raising
the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe. This is based on Pakistan's oft-repeated
threat of using its nuclear arsenal. But one needs to weigh the potential and
dangers of such a conflagration against the interminable jehad being waged by
Pakistan.
The exact size of each country's nuclear arsenal is unclear. But it is
commonly accepted that India has 50-100 warheads, while Pakistan may have
20-30. According to seismological evidence of the 1998 tests, India's nuclear
weapon yields were 20-40 kilotons, while Pakistani bombs ranged from 2-10
kilotons. An important aspect is the delivery systems, where Pakistan was
considered to have an edge until recently. Its medium range Ghauri and Shaheen
missiles, which would reach Indian targets in a matter of minutes, are based
on solid fuel technology, while India's short-range Prithvis are based on
liquid fuel technology. Thus the Prithvis need to be positioned close to the
border, and require several hours of fueling as opposed to the Pakistani
missiles. India has remedied this asymmetry recently, with the testing and
induction of the modified Agni missile. The medium range Agni-II is solid-fuel
based and can be based deeper in India as an effective second-strike option.
Most analysts fear that Pakistan would pull the nuclear trigger first,
particularly if Indian forces make major gains, such as threatening to cut off
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Such an attack, if it did happen, would be
missile-based. However, Pakistan must realize that if it did strike first, it
would face massive retaliation from India. Such massive nuclear retaliation,
possibly with a combination of Prithvis and Agni-IIs by India would
undoubtedly end Pakistan's existence as a nation. Thus it is difficult to
believe that a Pakistani first strike would happen. It is more likely that
Pakistan will use ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads against Indian
targets. The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s set a precedent for such an exchange.
The missiles fired by each country were more of a nuisance, with few cases of
mass casualties. In the case of South Asia, one can argue that use of
ballistic missiles against population centres could be more deadly, however,
the international community is likely to take a dim view of such attacks. It
is roughly estimated that about 100,000-150,000 deaths may occur in a single
nuclear attack on a large city in South Asia. With non-nuclear missiles,
particularly Pakistani missiles of Chinese and North Korean origin that have
suspect accuracy, the toll is likely to be several magnitudes lower, but may
be more effective as a weapon of terror. India's Prithvi and Agni are
considered to be more accurate.
If a nuclear or ballistic missile exchange does occur, it is likely to be
aimed at advancing armies to avoid international consequences. In this
context, the Indian military has done recent exercises to train for a nuclear
war. Thus the Indian military is likely to survive such an exchange more
effectively than Pakistan's smaller and less-prepared forces.
Any preparation for a nuclear exchange would have to include protection of
the central government and political officials. In this case, Pakistan, where
the political system is already decimated and disrupted, may be at a rare
advantage. A sudden attack on the Indian Parliament building when it is in
session could potentially remove the entire democratic leadership of the
country. India would have to take appropriate preventive steps to ensure that
its political system can continue to function in a war with potential for
nuclear exchanges.
Conventional Warfare
The above discussion indicates that a nuclear war is unlikely, and thus
conventional forces would decide the outcome of a war. Below is a discussion
of the conventional strengths of the two nations.
Air Force
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has about 700-800 combat aircraft. A majority are
the older MiG 21bis. There are several squadrons each of Sukhoi 30s, Mirage
2000s and MiG 29s. The Sukhois, the Mirages and the MiG 29s are some of the
best multi-role fighters in the world, and could be used in gaining air
superiority in a war with Pakistan. India is in the process of acquiring
additional Mirage 2000s from France, and Sukhoi 30s from Russia. The Pakistani
air force, with about half the numeric strength, relies mainly on Chinese F-7s
(a modified version of the MiG 21), F-6s (modified MiG 19), the older Mirage
III and V, and a squadron or so of F-16s. The latter are probably in disrepair
due to denial of spare parts by the US. Most Pakistani planes would lack the
Beyond Visual Range (BVR) and the Look Down capability. Due to these PAF
drawbacks, and with sheer numbers, the IAF is likely to establish superiority
very early in a war. Pakistan's limited advanced fighters are unlikely to be
used in a strike role, thus the war would be fought mostly in Pakistani skies.
IAF strikes are likely to happen at night with low-flying deep strike aircraft
attacking command and control centers and radar and transmission towers, and
escort fighters dueling it out with Pakistani interceptors. In the 1971 war,
the very first day saw dozens of Pakistani planes shot out of the sky with
lighter IAF losses. This scenario is likely to repeat and Pakistan could lose
half of its functioning combat aircraft within a week. With significant air
superiority, India may have the flexibility of using deep strike aircraft in
response to a nuclear first strike.
Navy
The Indian Navy is equipped with one aircraft carrier, the Viraat, and an
array of destroyers, frigates, submarines and other naval vessels. India has
discussed the leasing of nuclear-powered submarines, which would complete the
"triad" of nuclear arsenal necessary for second strikes, but it is
not clear that the submarines would be inducted by this summer. A
submarine-based cruise missile, Brahmos, in joint development with Russia, may
be available for induction within the next year.
The Pakistani Navy lacks an aircraft carrier, leaving its only port,
Karachi vulnerable to air attacks from the Viraat, as well as to a naval siege
that could put the economic squeeze on it during a war. The number of
destroyers, frigates and submarines each in the Pakistan navy are
approximately half that of India. During a war, the Pakistani navy would be
hard-pressed to keep its supply lines from allies open, and as in the air
campaign, most of the action would be in Pakistani waters.
Army
India has numerical superiority in the number of tanks, with 4500 versus 2000
of Pakistan. While little qualitative difference exists between the two
nation's tank forces, the numerical superiority of India's tanks combined with
its likely rapid gaining of air superiority will wear down Pakistan's ground
defenses. India's transport helicopter fleet far outnumbers that of Pakistan,
thus enabling India to rapidly deploy troops behind enemy lines.
The ground war is likely to be the most closely fought, but if India
concentrates its land campaign on retaking POK, it may very well be able to
wrest control of most of that territory and thus render untenable future
Pakistani incursions into Jammu and Kashmir. A siginficant destruction of
Pakistani military would be a big aim of the campaign, rather than taking
territory (except POK). India would also be looking to neutralize or wrest
control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles. Success in these
arenas would be a measure of how far the long-term goal of emasculating
Pakistan's capacity to export terror is achieved.
Strategic Air Defense/and Air Theater Control
Phalcon AWACS
This is a theatre in which India has gained the upper hand with timely
acquisitions. After some uncertainly, it appears that the Phalcon AWACS system
has been acquired from Israel. The Phalcon, which was denied to China after US
intervention, is an integrated phased array system consisting of airborne
sensors, radar, electronic intelligence and communications intelligence, that
can provide complete coverage at large distances. The Indian military could
control the air theater over Pakistan effectively using the Phalcon. The
system detects launches of aircraft and missiles anywhere in enemy territory,
and provides inputs to air commanders in real time, giving a strong edge in
air battles and war strategy. The Phalcon probably increases by a magnitude
India's air advantage over Pakistan, making an early and overwhelming victory
achievable. The Phalcon systems could be operated deep within India while
tracking aircraft and even naval vessels.
Arrow Anti-Ballistic Missile System
Along with the Phalcon AWACS, India has also been negotiating the purchase of
the Arrow ABM system. With the ever-increasing threat of Pakistani Ghauris and
Shaheens, an ABM system may be a god-send for the population centres of India
in case of war. It is not clear if the complete Arrow ABM system has been
inducted, with both India and Israel keeping the purchases and deployment of
weapons systems out of the public eye. The US had raised objections to the
deal, citing the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). The MCTR is aimed
at offensive missile systems, and the US objections may have been aimed at
reducing tensions than at actually blocking the deal. It is now known that at
least one component of the Arrow ABM system, the Green Pine radar, has already
been inducted and deployed with Israeli technical assistance. It is possible
that if the Arrow missile export was blocked, India could use the Russian
anti-ballistic missile Antey 2500 in combination with the Green Pine radar. It
is believed that India has acquired at least six battalions of Antey missiles,
with each battalion capable of intercepting 16 ballistic missiles. The Antey
2500s are likely to be used close to the LOC and the IB to protect crucial
Indian defense locations, as well as population centers in India's largest
cities. While the Antey 2500's accuracy in conjunction with the Green Pine
radar is unknown, its deployment is likely to further deter Pakistan from
considering a nuclear first strike.
Wild Cards
Help from Pakistan's Arab allies
Saudi Arabia and perhaps the United Arab Emirates may be tempted to help out
Pakistan with military aid, including advanced AWACS planes and even MiG 25s.
However, in all likelihood the UN Security Council would pass resolutions
banning military aid to India and Pakistan at the outset of the conflict. Arab
countries would be unlikely to defy such a ban. Futhermore, once India has
established superiority in the air and in the Arabian Sea, supply links to
such aid would be non-existent.
Chinese Intervention?
China is Pakistan's most faithful ally and benefactor. It has supplied over
two dozen F-7s to Pakistan since January. However, during a conflict, it is
unlikely to take sides, particularly in light of recently improving relations
with India. The biggest Chinese threat is the opening up of a second front for
India. If India concentrates its forces on the western borders, the eastern
sector would be vulnerable. However, China is unlikely to defy UN resolutions
or take on India overtly, unless the existence of Pakistan was threatened, by
which time it would be too late for outside intervention. China's direct
involvement would be deterred by the possibilities of a world war breaking
out, with Russian and US involvement.
The US Decision: Which Ally to Support
The US would be faced with a tough decision. During the Afghanistan conflict
last year, there were some US military officials who suggested the
unthinkable, that it would support terrorist Pakistan in a conflict against
the world's largest democracy, India. However, the situation has changed since
then. The majority of the Al Qaeda threat has dissipated, and only pockets are
left now, mostly in Pakistan. An Indo-Pakistan conflict would likely result in
the further elimination of Al Qaeda elements remaining in Pakistan, thus the
US is not likely to look at an Indian attack on Pakistan as critically.
The question remains of US personnel in Pakistan. Families of US diplomats
have already been evacuated in the aftermath of the recent church attack in
Islamabad. There are however potentially thousands of FBI and CIA agents all
over Pakistan, and the US military occupies air bases in western Pakistan.
These personnel would need to be rapidly withdrawn, and some may get caught in
the conflict. It is likely that the US has contingency plans since December,
when the potential for war became serious.
The US may introduce resolutions in the UN to stop military aid and oil to
the two countries at the start of a war. Such a ban would more seriously
affect Pakistan. India would have fuel reserves for 2-3 months, enough to
complete its campaign, but Pakistan would fall short much earlier in both oil
supplies and military hardware.
Conclusion
It is safe to conclude that Pakistan is unlikely to change its Kashmir
terrorism policy without external armed intervention. The continued loss of
lives and economic damage of this policy for India needs to be weighed against
the consequences of a brief campaign to retake PoK, which would removing
infiltration paths for Pakistan, and dismantling its military strength and
nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear threat, though real, has been overblown in western circles. The
acquiring of an ABM system by India would significantly diminish the ability
of Pakistan to incur unacceptable damage in a first strike, and leave the
latter open to massive nuclear retaliation that would signal the end of the
country. India's army chief, General Padmanabhan, made that amply clear in
well-publicized statements earlier this year.
A conventional war is thus the most likely scenario, with significant
advantages to India, which would rapidly gain control in the air and sea. This
campaign would likely result in wresting control of the crucial PoK territory
from Pakistan, which the latter uses for training and as a logistical base and
staging area for terrorist infiltration into India. The war would provide an
opportunity to significantly diminish Pakistan's military strength, and to
dismantle its nuclear arsenal.
India would do well to concentrate its ground thrusts to POK, with
incursions into the rest of Pakistani territory limited to tactical gains and
to air attacks or special forces raids on military command and control
centers, communication facilities, ISI headquarters and jehadi bases such as
the one in Muridke.
Before embarking on such a campaign, India needs to do the diplomatic
groundwork to quietly preempt any overt intervention by other countries.
